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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
THE DYING PATIENT, THE DOCTOR, AND THE LAW
J. RUSSELL ELKINTON, M.D.t
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PRIME FUNCTION of the law is to protect human values;
hence, the law is concerned frequently with human death. The
prime function of medicine is to promote human health; hence, the
physician is concerned intimately with the prevention or postponement
of human death. In carrying out this professional activity the physician
is constantly making decisions that are determined by his understanding
of the needs of the patient, by his professional competence, and by the
moral, ethical, and legal framework of the society in which he functions.
Thus, the law and society have a direct interest in these decisions, an
interest that is heightened by the greatly increasing power that rapid
biomedical advances have given to such decisions. As Judge Burger
has said: "The law always lags behind the most advanced thinking in
every area. It must wait until the theologians and the moral leaders
and events have created some common ground, some consensus."'
As lawyers, theologians, and physicians concerned with the care of the
dying patient, we are holding this Symposium to assist in the search
for such a consensus.
II. MEDICAL DECISIONS ABOUT THE DYING PATIENT
The doctor has always had to make decisions about his patient
who is threatened with death. Until recently, such decisions have been
less crucial because he has had relatively little power to bring to bear
on the issue. Now, for at least some of his patients, new knowledge
and its tools - antibiotics, potent drugs, intravenous fluids, resusci-
tation apparatus, artificial and transplanted organs - enter into the
decisions that affect the time and nature of the act of dying. In his efforts
to preserve life and restore health, the physician sometimes may fail to
give enough consideration to his other obligation, namely, to relieve
suffering and to allow the patient, if he is to die, to die with comfort
and dignity. This if, of course, lies at the very heart of this dilemma
that repeatedly faces the physician.
t Professor of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. A.B.,
Haverford College, 1932; M.D., Harvard Medical School, 1937. Editor, Annals of
Internal Medicine. This Article is a modified version of an editorial entitled When
Do We Let the Patient Dief, which appeared in 68 ANNALS INT. MXD. 695 (1968).
1. Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS INT. MFD., Supp. 7,
Sept., 1967, at 17.
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There is another aspect to the decisions which the doctor has to
make today in the care of dying patients: never before has he had
to make such decisions so squarely in the public eye. During the past
few months the lay news media have given extensive coverage to a
series of dramatic medical stories which have seized the public interest
and which illustrate this problem. The first of these was the posting in
a hospital in England of a notice directing which patients - in the case
of cardiac or respiratory arrest - should be resuscitated and which
should not; those over 65 years of age or with certain diseases fell
under -the interdict. More widely reported have been the stories of
human heart transplants. For the first time in medical history, the
human heart is being transplanted from patients just dead into patients
who are dying. With such eye-catching phrases in news stories as
"who shall die," "when are you really dead," and "playing God," and
with serious feature articles and discussions on television, the lay press
and news media are bringing home to the public some of the basic
ethical, social, and legal problems involved. The public is becoming
much more aware and wants to know, and indeed should know, about
these problems; after all, not only are they the final arbiters of the
moral standards and the laws operative in our society - they are the
patients.
Every experienced doctor knows the problems in general care of
the dying patient and his family. There is nothing new about these
problems; they have been written about by physicians who have stressed
the need for understanding and compassionate support of the patient
to the very end2 and by sociologists who have emphasized the import-
ance of the awareness of the impending death by each member of the
social unit involved.' The physician tries very hard to meet his respon-
sibilities in this situation, but he knows that sometimes his diagnosis,
and particularly his prognosis, can be wrong. This knowledge tempers
his decisions as to what to do and what not to do for an apparently
dying patient. But given a patient who in the doctor's best medical
judgment has no foreseeable chance of recovery, to what lengths does
one go to prolong the patient's life? Specific answers to this question
can only be given in specific cases, but always the answers involve
making value judgments concerning the quality of the patient's remain-
ing life in addition to estimating its possible duration. These judgments
are not easy ones to make.
2. See J. HINTON, DYING (1967); A. WORCESTER, THE CARE OF THE AGED, THE
DYING AND THE DEAD (1st ed. 1935) ; Alvarez, Care of the Dying, 150 J.A.M.A. 86(1952); Aring, Intimations of Mortality, 69 ANNALS INT. MED. 137 (1968). Bean,
On Death, 101 ARCHIVES INT. MED. 199 (1958); Bulger, Doctors and Dying, 112
ARCHIVES INT. MED. 327 (1963).
3. See B. GLASER & A. STRAUSS, AWARENESS or DYING (1965).
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III. CATEGORIES OF DYING PATIENTS
There are four main categories of dying patients in whose cases pro-
longation of life is a problem: (1) the patient with acute cardiac or
respiratory arrest who requires instant resuscitation; (2) the patient
whose prognosis is hopeless and who is being maintained on supportive
therapy; (3) the dying patient who is a potential cadaveric donor of
an organ - kidney, liver, or heart - to another dying patient; and
(4) the patient who is dying of an intractable disease but whose life
may be prolonged and indeed rehabilitated by the transplantation of a
living organ or the use of an artificial organ. The problems of the
first two types of patients are the ones that are met most frequently
by physicians in their day-to-day practice. There are many fewer
patients in the last two categories, but their problems currently are
presenting dramatic examples of the moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas
being posed by the rapid advances in biomedical science. The fourth
category, however, differs from the other three in that survival for a
much longer period, and even rehabilitation, is under consideration,
and hence grave socioeconomic problems are raised as well.
A. The Acutely Dying Patient
The patient with acute cardiac or respiratory arrest seldom pre-
sents - at the moment of urgent decision - any great ethical problem.
This is the patient who has had a sudden coronary occlusion, or has
been electrocuted, or is drowning. Every effort should be made to
resuscitate him immediately. Contra-indications to such efforts include
a period of cerebral anoxia long enough to cause failure of return of
cerebral function, and any other relevant medical factor known to the
responsible physician concerning that particular patient. With the
rapidly increasing number of intensive care units, opportunities for
such resuscitation are becoming much more frequent.
B. The Patient with a Hopeless Case
For the patient with a hopeless case, relief of suffering is surely
the primary goal - that is, if the case really is hopeless. Most of us
who are physicians remember patients who, with vigorous treatment,
have lived, at least for a while longer, when we had predicted that
they would die; hindsight tells us that the prognosis had not been as
hopeless as we had thought. But many patients alnost surely do have
hopeless prognoses; should their lives be prolonged even if they are in
[VOL. 13 : p. 732
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intractable pain? If the patient is unconscious for a very long time
(i.e., decerebrate either because of intracranial disease or injury or as
the result of a partially successful attempt at resuscitation), he is
unaware of pain; but again his case poses the problem: should life be
prolonged in a "living" organism that no longer is a person? One
way that the compassionate physician can answer these questions is to
withhold therapeutic measures that would prolong life - an "invisible
act" of omission.' If therapeutic measures include machines already in
use, such as respirators or cardiac pacemakers, the decision becomes
more difficult and less "invisible" (someone has to pull the plug or turn
the switch). It is still an act of omission but the ethical and legal
dilemma remains: is this an act of mercy or an act of murder?
Theologians and lawyers, as well as physicians, have given atten-
tion to this dilemma. Perhaps the most famous pronouncement of a
Christian church is that of Pope Pius XII. In 1957, in response to a
question as to whether a doctor should stop artificial respiration in a
moribund patient, he replied that the doctor is required to use ordinary,
but not extraordinary, means to prolong life.' If extraordinary treat-
ment (such as use of a respirator) is stopped, the patient dies not from
that act but from the underlying disease or injury. The use of this
guideline, however, presents a twofold problem; first, precisely what is
extraordinary treatment must be defined, and second, what is extra-
ordinary treatment today may be ordinary treatment tomorrow, or
such treatment may be extraordinary in Tibet but ordinary in the
United States. Anglican opinion on this problem has been expressed
recently by the Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility:6
life is good, a gift of God, and death should be a voluntary surrender.
In a given case the decision to extend treatment so far but no farther
can be arrived at both from a utilitarian approach (balancing the pa-
tient's interests with those of society) and the Christian approach (that
it may be God's will and an act of love to relinquish a life that no
longer has meaning as a human person). The responsibility for the
decision lies squarely on the individual physician, but he must remain
answerable to society and to God.
4. More than 20 years ago, I was responsible for the care of a young woman in
the end state of multiple sclerosis. She was in great pain and had widespread ulcera-
tions over the surface of her body from which she developed a septicemia (infection
of her blood stream). At that time a new antibiotic, penicillin, had just become
available. With the agreement of the patient's family, I withheld the penicillin and the
patient died quickly - her suffering was relieved. Penicillin is an ordinary treatment
today but I would still make the same decision.
5. Pope Pius X1I, Replies to Some Important Questions Concerning "Reanima-
tion", in DIscoRsI AI MEDICI 607 (1959).
6. CHURCH ASsEMBLY BOARD FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, DECISIONs ABOUT
LIFE AND DEATH (1965).
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Physicians who have written of this heavy responsibility agree, in
the main, with this conclusion but quite naturally underscore their
fallibility in making an absolutely sure prognosis and in judging the
quality of the human life remaining.7 Physicians are also well aware
that they must make these decisions with due regard to the patient's
family for they (the members of the family) are the ones who have
loved the patient over the years and who may find it difficult to accept
him, in his hopelessly unconscious state, as a "non-person" and as
equivalent to being dead.
The law is helpful but does not solve this dilemma. An act of
commission to end the life of another human being is as illegal for a
doctor as for anyone else, the law being based on the principle of the
sanctity of human life.' The legal status of an act of omission of therapy
that results in the death of the patient is less certain: the physician has
legal obligations to his patient but has much more room for exercising
judgment. As the theologian, Joseph Fletcher, has pointed out in
discussing the legal aspects of the decision not to prolong life, the legal
status of omission stems from the relationship of the doctor to his
patient rather than the principle of the sanctity of human life.' Perhaps
for this reason no doctor has been convicted for causing death by
omission of treatment for compassionate reasons.
The definition of death is also germane to -this problem and has
been subjected recently to fairly intensive scrutiny. 1° In the past, cessa-
tion of heartbeat and respiration has been the accepted medical and legal
criterion for death; now, new criteria are being proposed in light of the
knowledge that different organs and tissues die at different rates and
that a functioning cerebrum is essential to the life of a human being as
a person. These new medical criteria - not yet recognized by the law
- include evidence that activity of the central nervous system has
ceased irreversibly, as shown by flat electroencephalographic (EEG)
tracings (cerebrum), bilateral mydriasis (upper brain stem), no res-
7. See Giertz, Ethical Problems in Medical Procedures in Sweden, in ETHIcs
IN MEDICAL PROGRESS 139 (M. O'Connor & G. Wolstenholme eds. 1966) ; Ayd, The
Hopeless Case, 181 J.A.M.A. 1099 (1962) ; Williamson, Life or Death, 197 J.A.M.A.
793 (1966).
8. See generally G. WILLIAMS, Tin SANCTITY op LIVE AND TrHE CRIMINAL LAW
(1957).
9. Fletcher, Legal Aspects of the Decision Not to Prolong Life, 203 J.A.M.A.
65 (1968).
10. Murray, Organ Transplants: The Practical Possibilities, in ETHICS IN
MEDICAL PROGRESS 54 (M. O'Connor & G. Wolstenholme eds. 1966) ; Bi6rck, On the
Definitions of Death, 14 WORLD MED. J. 137 (1967) ; Halley & Harvey, Medical vs.
Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A. 423 (1968) ; Muller, Legal Medicine and
the Delimitation of Death, 14 WORLD MED. J. 140 (1967) ; Voigt, The Criteria of
Death, Particularly in Relation to Transplantation Surgery, 14 WORLD MED. J. 143
(1967) ; Wasserman, Problematical Aspects of the Phenomenom of Death, 14 WORLD
MED. J. 146 (1967).
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piration when the respirator has been turned off for at least 5 minutes
(medulla), and abolition of reflexes (spinal cord). To these have
been added: a falling blood pressure when vasopressor drugs are with-
drawn, cessation of cerebral blood flow as shown by angiography, and
cessation of reaction to atropine." These refinements should be helpful
in the case of the long-unconscious patient with brain damage whose
heart continues to beat. Thus, a flat EEG tracing may be of considerable
help in deciding that the cerebrum is damaged to the extent that the
patient can never again become a conscious human person. 12 The EEG
tracing should be flat for a minimum of 4 hours; where barbiturate
toxicity is involved or the patient is hypothermic the minimum probably
should be 24 hours and, in the case of young children, several days.
The validity of this physiological evidence of the death of the cerebrum
must be established beyond any doubt. It is known that 75 to 90 per-
cent of patients with severe head injury who have been unconscious for
1 month or more make a partial or complete recovery.13 If the remain-
ing 10 to 25 percent who do not recover can be shown to have met these
neurological criteria for cerebral death, then these criteria might be
used by a conscientious and compassionate physician to support his
decision to withdraw supportive treatment from such a patient. If
medical science can establish the validity of these criteria for the death
of the cerebrum (the higher centers of the brain), then the law will
need to establish the special circumstances under which such cessation
of function of the brain alone, without parallel cessation of the heart-
beat and respiration, is acceptable as a definition of death.' 4
The problem of euthanasia - the deliberate act of commission to
end the life of a suffering patient - is highly controversial and, for
most physicians, lies outside the realm of practical medical problems.
Joseph Fletcher has stated cogently the case for "Euthanasia: our
right to die,"'" basing it primarily on the belief that the quality of
life or personality is far more important than mere physical exist-
11. See Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112 (1964) ; Schwab,
Potts & Bonazzi, EEG As An Aid in Determining Death in Presence of Cardiac
Activity (Ethical, Legal and Medical Aspects), 15 EEG CLINICAL NtURO-PHYSIOLOGY
147 (1963).
12. See note 11 supra.
13. Lewin, Severe Head Injuries, 60 PROCE'EDINGs ROYAL SoC. Mw. 1208 (1967).
14. Halley & Harvey, supra note 10.
The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, entitled A Definition of Irreversible Coma,
has just been published (205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968)). Death of the brain is defined
by the presence of the following criteria: (1) total unreceptivity and unresponsitivity
to stimuli, (2) no spontaneous muscular movements or breathing, (3) no elicitable
reflexes; a flat electroencephalogram is confirmatory; all tests to be repeated 24 hours
later with no change, and in the absence of hypothermia and central nervous system
depressants such as barbiturates. The Report suggests that if the medical profession
should agree on these criteria of brain death, no statutory change in the law should
be necessary.
15. J. Fletcher, MORALS AND MEDICIN4 ch. 6 (1960). 6
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ence and that severe pain and suffering demoralizes personality,
destroys personal integrity, and thus negates the importance of life
and its quality. Under most circumstances in which the question
might arise, experienced physicians are acutely aware of their fallibility
as to prognosis, are cognizant of the importance of their patients' faith
in the physician's total commitment to the safeguarding of life, and are
very hesitant to contravene the judgment of society, if not of their own
religious belief. There is, however, a "grey" area in which society and
the law would do well to grant some discretion to the conscientious
physician. To administer to a dying patient in great pain heavy doses
of narcotics is a compassionate and frequently performed act and as
such is an act of commission. But the primary intent is to relieve suf-
fering, not to end life, and the law and society should recognize that
this is so.
C. The Dying Potential Donor of an Organt
The dying patient who is a potential donor of an organ for
transplantation presents new and special problems. Because of the need,
at present, to perform the transplantation as quickly as possible after
the death of the donor, his care as a patient may be jeopardized or his
moment of death prematurely anticipated. The first of these hazards
might be diminished by keeping the primary responsibility for his care
in the hands of doctors other than the transplantation team. Doctors
engaged in transplantation surgery are acutely aware of ,this need to
protect the rights of the dying potential donor16 - and on some
occasions have helped to reverse the apparent fatal course of such a
patient. 17 Avoiding the second hazard turns again on careful definition
of the nature and time of death. This is especially true if the patient's
death is being caused by acute intracranial trauma or disease. In this
case, the time required to obtain neurological signs of death of the
central nervous system - including a flat EEG tracing over a period
of 4 hours - is too long to wait to remove an organ that is sufficiently
viable for transplantation. Moreover, such neurological signs have less
meaning in the acute situation measured in hours rather than in days.
Hence the more conventional criteria of cessation of heartbeat and
respiration must be used by the physicians responsible for such dying
patients. We do not want to apply a double ethical standard: one for
the unconscious patient with a head injury who is not being considered
as a possible donor of an organ and another for the same kind of
16. See Murray, supra note 10; Starzl, Ethical Problems in Organ Transplanta-
tion, 67 ANNALS INT. MED., Supp. 7, Sept., 1967, at 32.
17. See ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS (M. O'Connor & G. Wolstenholne eds.
1966).
[VOL. 13 : p. 732
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patient who is. If the clinical situation in the latter patient is such that
there clearly is no chance for survival after his heartbeat or respiration
has ceased spontaneously, then there is no ethical problem. But if
there is any chance at all that he might recover after resuscitation,
oxygenation of all organs might be maintained mechanically for the
number of days necessary to establish that the minimum neurological
criteria had been met for irreversible damage and death of the central
nervous system, particularly the cerebrum. Only then might it be
ethically justified in this kind of a patient to remove an essential
organ and turn off the mechanical aids. In such circumstances, the
patient might be considered to have died before the transplantation
rather than after, and by the same criteria that are suggested for non-
donor dying patients with head injuries. Admittedly such precautions
may be less than satisfactory to the doctors responsible for the recipient
patient. But to the public they should be reassuring, and the public
will need reassurance as more and more dying patients are sought as a
source of organs for transplantation.
Many legal problems can be anticipated in a situation where rapid
decisions have to be made concerning the unusual disposal of parts of
the body of a person who usually has met an unexpected violent or
accidental death. One of the earliest legal cases deriving from uncer-
tainty of definition and time of death in the donor of an organ was
reported from Newcastle-upon-Tyne in England in 1963.18 The poten-
tial donor of a needed kidney had been assaulted, had sustained a
severe head injury, and had been admitted to the hospital in coma.
When he stopped breathing on June 16 he was placed in a respirator
and oxygenation was maintained for 24 hours until the recipient patient
was ready to receive a kidney. On June 17 the kidney was removed,
the respirator was then turned off, no spontaneous respiration re-
mained, and the heartbeat and circulation ceased. The physicians be-
lieved that the patient died medically on June 16 when respiration
ceased due to brain damage. The coroner ruled that death occurred
legally when the heart ceased to beat on June 17 but that the doctors
were not responsible for the death. The assailant was convicted of man-
slaughter. This case illustrates the urgent need for law and medicine
to reach agreement on the definition of death, especially as applied to
the potential donors of organs for transplantation. 9
18. See Williams, Renal Transplantation front Mortally Injured Man, 2 LANCET
294 (1963).
19. This need for a legally acceptable, as well as a medically and morally accept-
able, definition of death has become even more apparent in some of the current instances
of transplantation of the heart. In Houston, Texas, a 62-year-old man received the
heart of a 36-year-old man whose brain was severely damaged as a result of a
beating; the donor's respiration ceased and brain waves were absent but his heart was
SU MM!:ER 1968]
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D. The Dying Patient Recipient of an Organ
The dying patient whose life might be prolonged by benefit of
artificial or transplanted organs poses yet other ethical, legal, and
socioeconomic problems to the medical profession and to society.2"
Replacement of failing livers and hearts is only just beginning; replace-
ment of the failing kidney has provided the bulk of experience to date
in this field. Great technological advances in procedures for chronic
hemodialysis, and in tissue matching and immunosuppressive therapy,
have drastically improved the chances of prolonging the lives of a por-
tion of the approximately 7,000 patients in this country deemed suitable
for such therapy who otherwise would die each year of chronic renal
failure. Now, approximately 85 percent of patients in chronic dialysis
programs2 and 38 to 70 percent of patients with transplanted kidneys
(varying according to whether the donor is a cadaver, sibling, or
parent, and according to the type of medical center) survive for at least
1 year.22 This is a tremendous achievement. But the difficult problem
remains of choosing who is to be given the chance to live and who must
be left -to die - a problem that will be with us as long as the number
of candidates outstrips the necessary medical facilities. Thus, the very
success of these procedures confronts society with decisions as to
whether to greatly expand these facilities to meet the need. A com-
mittee of scientists, appointed by the Bureau of the Budget, recom-
mended in September 1967 that the Federal Government undertake
just such a massive program at the cost of many millions of dollars.2 3
Whether the Congress will decide to do so in the face of limited re-
sources remains to be seen. Meanwhile, physicians must continue to
make this most difficult of decisions on the uncertain moral criteria
of who is needed most, who will contribute most, who is most likely
to be rehabilitated, and, not infrequently, on the basis of first come, first
served.2 4
still functioning. The patient was pronounced dead by one physician although anotherphysician disagreed. The donor was placed in a respirator until the heart was removed
3 hours later. The county medical examiner anticipated difficulty in prosecuting the
donor's assailants for homicide. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1968, at 14, col. 4.
20. ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS (M. O'Conner & G. Wolstenholme eds. 1966)
Elkinton, Moral Problems in the Use of Borrowed Organs, Artificial and Trans-
planted, 60 ANNALS INT. MED. 309 (1964); Schreiner & Maher, Hemodialysis for
the Chronic Renal Failure, 62 ANNALS INT. MED. 551 (1965).
21. Bluemle, Current Status of Chronic Hemodialysis, 44 AM. J. MED. 749 (1968).
22. Murray, Barnes & Atkinson, Fifth Report of the Human Kidney Transplant
Surgery, 5 TRANSPLANTATION 752 (1967).
23. UNITED STATES BUREAU 01 THE BUDGET, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON CHRONIC
RENAL DISEASE (1967).
24. Sand, Livingston & Wright, Psychological Assessment of Candidates for a
Hemodialysis Program, 64 ANNALS INT. MED. 602 (1966); Schreiner & Maher,
supra note 20.
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Transplantation of the heart or -the liver probably will pose even
greater problems along these lines, and the public is rapidly becoming
aware that this is so. Will this lifesaving procedure - if it works -
be available to all who need it and not just to the wealthy or those
situated by chance near the necessary medical facility? Will there be
a black market in transplantable organs? Or will such a black market
be prevented by the adoption of laws that will permit anyone to will
any part of his body for such a purpose? 2 If the required medical
facilities and programs are expanded, will it be at the expense of other
programs of vital medical prevention and care, or of urgent social pro-
grams such as those for education or for urban renewal? Already
these questions are being asked by many thoughtful men,"0 and one
United States Senator has called for a national commission to examine
these very problems.27 In the final analysis, society, by a process of
pragmatic political accommodation, will assign its own priorities. And
25. Efforts are being made to modernize the law on this subject. A committee,
headed by Professor E. B. Stason of Vanderbilt University School of Law, has been
drawing up a model law for a Uniform Anatomical Gift Act for consideration by state
legislatures and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The essence of such a law
would include the right of a person to will his body for such purposes (and to revoke
that decision if he wishes), the right of his survivors to make such a donation after
death if the deceased has expressed no opinion on the matter, organ gifts to be made
only to recognized hospitals and physicians, and donor cards carried on one's person to
constitute legal permission. Diamond, Are We Ready to Leave Our Bodies to the
Next Generation?, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 26. A bill written
along these lines has been introduced into the General Assembly of Pennsylvania
during the 1968 Session (House Bill No. 2314).
26. The National Academy of Science's Board of Medicine, under the chairman-
ship of Dr. Walsh McDermott, released a statement in February on cardiac trans-
plantation. Cardiac Transplant in Man, 204 J.A.M.A. 805 (1968) ; N.Y. Times, Feb.
28, 1968, at 21, col. 1. The Board emphasized that the procedure is totally experi-
mental and recommended that the operating team must be thoroughly competent in the
requisite surgical technique and knowledge of the biology of immune reactions, that
a group of physicians independent of the transplanters should care for, and approve
the use of, the prospective donor, that a similar group should certify the recipient's
need because of irreversible damage to his heart, and that the new knowledge gained
should be available to all interested parties. The Board did not offer an opinion as to
the moral or social desirability of the procedure.
A few weeks later the American Heart Association established a special com-
mittee, under the chairmanship of Dr. Eugene A. Stead, to study the ethical implica-
tions of heart transplantation and to set standards for the procedure. N.Y. Times,
March 18, 1968, at 15, col. 1.
During the past several years, groups of doctors, lawyers, theologians, bio-
medical scientists, and philosophers have been holding conferences and symposia on
the ethical and legal problems of medical advances, including transplantation: the
CIBA symposium in London, reported in ETiics IN MEDICAL PROGRESS (M. O'Conner
& G. Wolstenholme eds. 1966); the American College of Physicians Colloquium in
San Francisco, reported in The Changing Mores of Biomedical Research: A Col-
loquium on Ethical Dilemmas from Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS INT. MED., Supp. 7,
Sept., 1967; a conference sponsored by the Institute of Religion at the Texas Medical
Center and Rice University, held in March in Houston; and this Villanova Law
Review Symposium. In addition, countless responsible lay reporters and science writers
are writing on this subject and are so contributing to the education of the public.
27. S.J. Res. 145, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Senator Walter Mondale
(D-Minn.) is the sponsor. Most of the medical men and scientists testifying at a
hearing on this proposed legislation expressed great reservation about the desirability
of federal regulation at this stage of our knowledge. Hearings on S.J. Res. 145
Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Research of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 10
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in doing so it will have to make up its mind collectively as to what
extent, and at what cost, one segment of society is to have life pro-
longed by borrowing organs from the rest of society.
The ultimate question concerns the personal identity of a patient:
When is it lost? Personal identity, or the self, is surely centered in the
brain - the organ that is the seat of the mind with its memory, past
associations, instincts, and habit patterns. Although transplantation of
the brain has already been attempted experimentally in the dog, there
is no scientific evidence at present that it could be done with any
neural control of the body. I hope that society will never sanction,
either morally or legally, such a procedure in a human being, for surely
the identity of his person or self would be lost.
IV. EPILOGUE
When Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge,
they lost their immortality. Do we really want it back? Perhaps we have
lost our perspective on death as a natural part of the life that has
evolved on this planet. Each generation must die to make room for the
next; only in -this way can the forms of life evolve. For man, part of
our perspective depends on the age of the dying patient: death is more
natural for the old than for the young and middle-aged. A physician
friend has told me of the occasion when, visiting his elderly, widowed,
and very lonely father, the father suddenly collapsed with an arrested
heart. The son began external cardiac massage - and then he stopped.
It seemed to him that it was the right itime for his father to die. My
friend had the perspective of which I speak.
Whatever society may decide in the future about the moral, legal,
and philosophical problems surrounding the dying patient, the indi-
vidual physician has to meet them right now. The pressure of bio-
medical advances that give him his power to modify the time of death
no longer permits him to avoid decisions or to find easy answers within
the confines of conventional habits and professional customs. The de-
cision that he does make about the dying patient must come from his
own conscience, his religious faith or philosophy, his knowledge of the
legal and moral boundaries that society has set for him, and, most
importantly, his sense of his primary responsibility for the person of his
patient as a human being.
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